BROWN IS DEAD! LONG LIVE BROWN!: THE ENDLESS ATTEMPT TO CANONIZE A CASE
Gerald N. Rosenberg* welcome this Special Issue on twentieth-century constitutional history and the major article by Michael Klarman placing Brown in historical context. Far too much writing by legal academics obscures the larger political, social, economic, and cultural environment in which courts operate, decisions are issued, and behavior is modified. Klarman's careful and detailed analysis focuses on these crucial factors. In contrast to the artificial separation between legal analysis and work in the social sciences, Klarman's approach demonstrates the richness of genuine, multidisciplinary analysis.
In the first part of his Article, Klarman lays out the factors that fostered segregation. The argument is well-known to social scientists and Klarman does a good job reviewing and condensing the secondary literature.' In Part II, however, Klarman plows less cultivated fields and offers an interesting twist on the conventional claim that Brown set the stage for the civil rights movement and legislative action. I will focus my comments on this argument.
Klarman's aim is to understand the question of "indirect causation, 2 in this case the relationship between Brown and the civil rights legislation of the mid-1960s. Rejecting the conventional wisdom that Brown was crucial to the creation of the civil rights movement which, in turn, successfully pressured Congress and the , 1930-1970 (1982) ; Aldon D. Morris, The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change (1984) .
2 Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 Va. L. Rev. 7 (1994) . executive for civil rights legislation, 3 Klarman argues that Brown directly led to the election of rabid segregationists throughout the South. They, in turn, unleashed, or allowed to be unleashed, the brutal suppression of civil rights demonstrators. It was this violence, brought to the consciousness of Americans throughout the country by television, that shocked the nation and led to the enactment of civil rights legislation. Thus, Klarman concludes that Brown did help bring about civil rights legislation, but in a tortuous, indirect, and "perverse" manner. Klarman's attempt to find some beneficial effect from Brown is clever and plausible, but ultimately unpersuasive. In essence, he underestimates the deeply violent nature of Jim Crow and its defenders, and he uncritically grants important causal influence to Brown. Klarman is correct that television coverage of white violence inflicted on peaceful black demonstrators in the South, particularly at Birmingham and Selma, created a powerful pro-civil rights constituency in the rest of the country.' He also makes a plausible case that Brown led to the election of segregationist public officials who either encouraged such violence or allowed it to take place. However, he does not succeed in making the case that the actions of those officials added much to the violence. Oddly, Klarman misperceives the nature of Jim Crow, presenting it as less malign than it actually was. A more accurate and critical analysis suggests that it was the actions of the civil rights demonstrators themselves in the context of an entrenched system of apartheid that led to violence. Racist public officials, propelled to public office perhaps in part because of Brown, raised their ugly voices, but they were overwhelmed in a cacophony of hatred. Like those 3 For a fuller treatment of the lack of evidence for Brown's causal significance, see Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 49-57 (1991) . Part of the difficulty Klarman faces is that without considering alternative explanations, he can offer only a speculative story of causal influence. Putting the point, first, in somewhat abstract terms (see Figure I) , in order to argue convincingly that Brown (B) caused later violence (V) rather than being merely correlated with it, Klarman must show that the intervening demonstrations, marches, and protests of the civil rights movement (D, M, and P) did not, by themselves, cause V. 6 Without such a showing, Klarman is left with merely a correlation, a relationship that could have been caused by events following Brown. To make a persuasive case, then, he must test not only for whether Brown led to violence through his causal chain (B led to V), but also for whether the movement and its actions led to violence independently of Brown (events D, M, and P led to V independently of B). In so doing, he must explore the effects of the apartheid system (all the A's) within which all these events were occurring. For if causal connections can be made where the causal factors are independent of Brown, then violence and the civil rights legislation that followed from it would have occurred without Brown. If this is the case, as I argue it is, then whatever role Brown played in the election of extreme segregationists had a negligible effect on violence inflicted on civil rights demonstrators and on the ultimate enactment of civil rights legislation.
Empirical examination supports my alternate explanation. The violence Klarman finds crucial to the enactment of civil rights legislation was overdetermined. The civil rights movement on its own created a sufficiently violent response to pressure the federal government to act. It was not Brown that was "indispensable to the timing" of civil rights legislation as Klarman maintains, 7 but rather white violence in response to the actions of the civil rights move-6 This is particularly the case since Klarman has argued, in my view correctly, that Brown (B) did not create the civil rights movement nor lead to the actions the movement took (events D, M, and P). See Klarman, supra note 2, at 75-84; see also Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 107-56 (refuting the view that the Court and Brown created the civil rights movement because such a view incorrectly and unsuccessfully simplifies a complex set of events). ment independent of Brown. Klarman himself notes that the depth and strength of the apartheid system meant that black demands for equal fights would be met with violent repression. It did not take Brown for white southerners to understand that blacks marching for civil rights' posed a major threat to the status quo. They responded not to the abstract idea of equality contained in Brown but to the actual public demand for it. It was the civil fights movement taking to the streets that incited violence. With or without Brown, the events of the movement itself would have generated politicians to represent and defend the system. Thus, while Klarman makes a strong case that Brown heightened the rhetoric of rabid segregation, that rhetoric would have appeared as soon as blacks acted. It was the threat to the system posed by black southerners that was the main force creating the violent response.
Brown played a role, no doubt, in encouraging such violence, but it would have happened without the Court's action. When examined in the broader perspective, Brown was merely a ripple in a tidal wave. Post-Civil War southern history is full of examples of such violence directed at movements for civil rights. The unpleasant, underlying fact is that white southerners, with the help of all levels of government, constructed an entrenched system of apartheid throughout the South. Any serious challenge to that system was met with massive repression. And the most serious challenge came not from a far away capital but from the other side of the tracks when local black residents overcame their fear and publicly demanded the basic rights of American citizenship and human decency. After all, the white South had plenty of experience eviscerating federal mandates. For nearly a century it had emasculated the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of the law, and the Fifteenth Amendment guarantee of the right to vote, rendering them essentially empty within a full-blown apartheid system. One Court holding, on its own, posed little challenge.
White violence in response to black demands for justice is an old tactic. World War I, for example, was fought to "make the world safe for democracy," but when blacks after the war attempted to assert basic democratic rights for which they had fought and died, whites unleashed a torrent of violence. As Klarman acknowledges, recorded lynchings increased dramatically in 1918 and 1919.8 And violence was not limited to the South. Woodward notes twentyfive major race riots during the last six months of 1919, some in northern cities like Chicago. 9 The general expectation of white violence directed at proponents of civil rights is illustrated by the first Freedom Ride, the 1947 Journey of Reconciliation. No attempt was made to travel into the deep South because activists thought it would be a suicide mission. 10 Indeed, when Thurgood Marshall heard of the plan he warned that "'[a] disobedience movement on the part of Negroes and their white allies, if employed in the [deep] South, would result in wholesale slaughter with no good achieved.""' And when the second Freedom Ride was launched in 1961, the level and brutality of the violence was extraordinary.
2 Brown was unnecessary to lead white southerners to violently resist civil rights.
Violence against blacks and civil rights workers was commonplace throughout the South during the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Spectacular cases such as the murder of Medgar Evers, the attacks on the Freedom Riders, the Birmingham church bombing that killed four black girls, and the murder of three civil rights workers near Philadelphia, Mississippi, are well-known. [Vol. 80:161 80 beatings, and 6 murders. 14 It was a brave soul indeed who worked to end segregation in the South.
The Voter Education Project illustrates the crucial role of violence as a response to any public attempt by southern blacks to challenge segregation. Launched during the Kennedy administration, its official aim was to create local pressure for civil rights by increasing black voter registration in the southern states. The project's unofficial aim was to end civil rights demonstrations and marches that received publicity, led to violence, and pressured and embarrassed the administration. Indeed, Project participants were expressly prohibited from taking direct action, creating great debate among some groups over whether to join the Project. But both sides miscalculated, and violence often accompanied attempts at registration. For a black rural southerner to attempt to register to vote was to demonstrate an independence of spirit and a degree of courage that threatened the whole southern apartheid system in a way that unenforced Court decisions never could.
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Klarman responds that the level of both violence and racial rhetoric in the years prior to Brown were lower than in the 1960s. Klarman makes a strong case but it does not show a causal connection between Brown and racial violence. This is because there were no mass events like the Montgomery bus boycott, the sit-ins, the Freedom Rides, the large demonstrations at Birmingham and Selma, and so forth in the South in the pre-Brown days. Before Brown, southern blacks were not challenging all that was sacred to the apartheid system in a public, massive, and visceral way.
Klarman shows some awareness of the basic thrust of my position but does not integrate it into his argument. He comments that the "vast majority of southern whites in the 1950s favored racial segregation,"' 6 and notes "how deeply entrenched Jim Crow remained in the heart of the deep South."' 17 He points out, further, that the "timing of the Brown backlash depended on the white conservatives' perception of the imminence of the desegregation threat, which turned more on events like NAACP school desegregation petitions or crises like Autherine Lucy's attempted desegregation of the University of Alabama in early 1956 than on the Brown decision itself."' 1 8 In other words, it was not the Brown decision but rather the visceral challenge to segregation of blacks acting in the local areas that engendered a violent response. 19 Klarman does not show that such a violent response would have been absent if Brown had not been decided. The history of southem apartheid powerfully argues otherwise.
Klarman also notes that given the strength and depth of the apartheid system, moderate individuals, businesses, and governments were vulnerable to political and physical attack from more extreme segregationists. "Just as within a single state the black belt could pull along more moderate racial opinion, so within the South as a whole, extremist states could pressure their more moderate neighbors into conformity. '20 He notes, for example, that in Arkansas many "businessmen and other racial moderates, who had resented Governor Faubus's efforts to instigate racial discord in Little Rock, felt obliged to rally around him once Eisenhower had sent in the 101st Airborne." ' 21 But this has nothing to do with Brown. Given a white southern political, economic, social, and cultural system of apartheid, it did not require a Court decision to spur extreme segregationist politics and violent resistance once local blacks started their challenge. Locked in a segregationist system and culture, individuals, businesses, and governments had every incentive to support the status quo once opposing it became costly.
16 Klarman, supra note 2, at 106. 19 Thus, Governor Coleman of Mississippi, who served after Brown (1955-59), was able to oppose "some of the more extreme massive resistance measures" because there were no mass, public, civil rights actions in Mississippi at the time. Klarman, supra note 2, at 119.
Given this reality, civil rights forces could pick and choose where to stage demonstrations in order to incite white violence and gain leverage against the federal government. As Garrow notes, and Klarman correctly reports, King came to realize that "unprovoked white violence aimed at peaceful and unresisting civil rights demonstrators" was "necessary for a protest to receive the national coverage, attention, and support that would help to bring about federal legislation." ' For example, demonstrations in Albany, Georgia, in late 1961 and early 1962 were considered unsuccessful because of a lack of violence73 The lack of violence translated into little media coverage, no pressure on the federal government, and a perceived weakening of King. 4 Thus, the movement increasingly searched out cities where a violent response was likely to occur. The presence of Bull Connor in Birmingham and Jim Clark in Selma made those cities attractive targets. As Klarman notes, at Selma, "[d]uring [Sheriff] Clark's initial phase of restraint, the SCLC [Southern Christian Leadership Conference] apparently contemplated moving the campaign into the countryside, where a more violent white response would be assured."5 Similarly, the genesis of Freedom Summer 1964 was the knowledge that white Mississippians would respond violently to civil rights activity, as they had been doing with murderous consistency. However, it was believed that if many of the victims were northern white college students from privileged backgrounds rather than poor blacks, the nation would take notice. 26 Violent defense of apartheid independent of Brown was more than sufficient to create national revulsion and enormous pressure for civil rights legislation.
Klarman is aware of this dynamic and of the depth and strength of the segregation system. His argument is unpersuasive, however, because he is unable to differentiate the effect of Brown from the 22 Garrow, supra note 5, at 2; see also id. at 222, 225 (detailing the Southern Christian Leadership Conference's protest strategy and recounting Martin Luther King, Jr.'s version of that strategy); David J. Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference 171-72, 216-17, 228 (1986) [Vol. 80:161 effect of later events and from the causal influence of the larger culture. His examples of Ole Miss, Wallace's election in 1962, Birmingham, and Selma all occur after the Montgomery bus boycott, the sit-ins, the Freedom Rides, etc. He offers no way to distinguish the influence of Brown from that of these latter events. I have argued that these latter events, occurring in the southern apartheid system, and not Brown, led to the violent repression of Birmingham and Selma. 27 Klarman has plausibly argued that "Brown produced a southern political climate in which racial extremism flourished," 28 but that does not support his conclusion of nontrivial causal influence for Brown. He has not shown that violence would have been absent without Brown. The evidence suggests that violence came quickly and often when blacks took the movement to the streets.
Like many before him, Klarman has striven mightily to find a central role for the Court in producing significant social reform. 2 9 Yet surprisingly, Klarman himself admits that the chain of causation created by Brown was "strikingly indirect, and indeed almost perverse. "30 The lesson of Klarman's analysis of Brown is that the Court can be used to create opposition in the hope that it behaves so badly as to sway the public in one's favor. Even if Klarman is 27 Note, too, that the violence that caused the national revulsion did not occur until the 1960s, at least six years after Brown. The violence at Birmingham and Selma, identified by Klarman as well as others as key events, occurred in 1963 and 1965, nine and eleven years after Brown respectively. It is difficult to see how the immediate move to the right after Brown that Klarman notes drove these events. Rather, it seems more plausible that the demonstrations themselves, as well as the earlier actions of the movement, in the context of an apartheid system, created violent resistance. The bizarre nature of Klarman's causal argument raises the question of why he has engaged in this prodigious effort to find, at best, a complicated and tortuous causal connection. Why is defending the efficacy of Brown so important? The answer, I think, is that Brown is the symbol of the use of courts to produce significant social reform. 32 It provides legitimacy and a sense of purpose to liberal-leaning legal academics. Noble as this quest may be, it can not be undertaken in isolation from broader societal forces. Although more careful and thoughtful than most, Klarman's analysis is unpersuasive because, in the end, it focuses too closely on the Court and not closely enough on the society in which the Court operates. Brown is without doubt one of the Court's greatest decisions, but this does not mean it helped very much to further the cause of civil rights.
31 This assumes, of course, that you win the case! 32 In addition to the sources cited by Klarman, supra note 2, at 8 n.2, see Robert L. Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 237, 237 (1968) (calling Brown a "revolutionary statement of race relations law"); Jack Greenberg, The Supreme Court, Civil Rights and Civil Dissonance, 77 Yale L. J. 1520, 1522 (1968) (asserting that Brown "profoundly affected national thinking and has served as the principal ideological engine" of the civil rights movement); Jack Greenberg, Litigation for Social Change: Methods, Limits and Role in Democracy, 29 Record of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York 320, 331 (1974) (calling Brown the "principal inspiration to others who seek change through litigation"); Richard Kluger, Simple Justice 710 (1976) (asserting that Brown was "nothing short of a reconsecration of American ideals"); Aryeh Neier, supra note 29, at 57 (calling Brown the "symbol" of the Court's ability to produce significant social reform).
